This document specifies the NULL Authentication method and the ID_NULL Identification Payload ID Type for the IKEv2 Protocol. This allows two IKE peers to establish single-side authenticated or mutual unauthenticated IKE sessions for those use cases where a peer is unwilling or unable to authenticate or identify itself. This ensures IKEv2 can be used for Opportunistic Security (also known as Opportunistic Encryption) to defend against Pervasive Monitoring attacks without the need to sacrifice anonymity.
Introduction
The Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2), specified in [RFC7296] , provides a way for two parties to perform an authenticated key exchange. While the authentication methods used by the peers can be different, there is no method for one or both parties to remain unauthenticated and anonymous. This document extends the authentication methods to support unauthenticated and anonymous IKE sessions.
In some situations mutual authentication is undesirable, superfluous or impossible. The following three examples illustrate these unauthenticated use cases: o A user wants to establish an anonymous secure connection to a server. In this situation the user should be able to authenticate the server without presenting or authenticating to the server with their own identity. This case uses a single-sided authentication of the responder.
o A sensor that periodically wakes up from a suspended state wants to send a measurement (e.g. temperature) to a collecting server. The sensor must be authenticated by the server to ensure authenticity of the measurement, but the sensor does not need to authenticate the server. This case uses a single-sided authentication of the initiator. To meet these needs this document introduces the NULL Authentication method, and the ID_NULL ID type. This allows an IKE peer to explicitly indicate that it is unwilling or unable to certify its identity.
Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this When using NULL Authentication, the content of the AUTH payload is computed using the syntax of pre-shared secret authentication, described in Section 2.15 of [RFC7296] . The values SK_pi and SK_pr are used as shared secrets for the content of the AUTH payloads generated by the initiator and the responder respectively. Note that this is identical to how the content of the two last AUTH payloads is generated for the non-key-generating EAP methods (see Section 2.16 of [RFC7296] for details).
The IKEv2 Authentication Method value for NULL Authentication is 13.
Identification Payload
When a remote peer is not authenticated, any ID presented in the Identification Data field of the ID payload cannot be validated. To avoid the need of sending a bogus ID Type with placeholder data, this specification defines a new ID Type, ID_NULL. The Identification Data field of the ID payload for this ID Type MUST be empty.
If NULL Authentication is in use and anonymity is a concern then ID_NULL SHOULD be used in the Identification payload. Some examples of cases where a non-null identity type and value with NULL Authentication can be used are logging, troubleshooting and in scenarios where authentication takes place out of band after the IKE SA is created (like in [AUTOVPN] 
for details).
ID_NULL is primarily intended to be used with NULL Authentication but could be used in other situations where the content of the Identification Payload is not used. For example, ID_NULL could be used when authentication is performed via raw public keys and the identities are the keys themselves. These alternative uses of ID_NULL should be described in their own respective documents.
The IKEv2 Identification Payload ID Type for ID_NULL is 13.
INITIAL_CONTACT Notification
The identity of a peer using NULL Authentication cannot be used to find existing IKE SAs created by the same peer, as the peer identity is not authenticated. For that reason the INITIAL_CONTACT notifications MUST NOT be used to delete any other IKE SAs based on the same peer identity without additional verification that the existing IKE SAs with matching identity are actually stale.
The standard IKE Liveness Check procedure, described in Section 2. 
Traffic Selectors
Traffic Selectors and narrowing allow two IKE peers to mutually agree on a traffic range for an IPsec SA. An unauthenticated peer must not be allowed to use this mechanism to steal traffic that an IKE peer intended to be for another host. This is especially problematic when supporting anonymous IKE peers behind NAT, as such IKE peers build an IPsec SA using their pre-NAT IP address that are different from the source IP of their IKE packets. A rogue IKE peer could use malicious Traffic Selectors to obtain access to traffic that the host never intended to hand out. Implementations SHOULD restrict and isolate all anonymous IKE peers from each other and itself and only allow it access to itself and possibly its intended network ranges.
One method to achieve this is to always assign internal IP addresses to unauthenticated IKE clients, as described in Section 2.19 of [RFC7296] . Implementations may also use other techniques, such as internal NAT and connection tracking.
Implementations MAY force unauthenticated IKE peers to single hostto-host IPsec SAs. When using IPv6 this is not always possible, so in this case implementations MUST be able to assign full /64 address block to the peer as described in [RFC5739] , even if it is not authenticated.
Security Considerations
If authenticated IKE sessions are possible for a certain traffic selector range between the peers, then unauthenticated IKE SHOULD NOT be allowed for that traffic selector range. When mixing authenticated and unauthenticated IKE with the same peer, policy rules should ensure the highest level of security will be used to protect the communication between the two peers. See [RFC7435] for details.
If both peers use NULL Authentication, the entire key exchange becomes unauthenticated. This makes the IKE session vulnerable to active Man-in-the-Middle Attacks.
Using an ID Type other than ID_NULL with the NULL Authentication Method may compromise the client's anonymity in case of an active MITM attack.
IKE implementations without NULL Authentication have always performed mutual authentication and were not designed for use with unauthenticated IKE peers. Implementations might have made assumptions remote peers are identified. With NULL Authentication these assumptions are no longer valid. Furthermore, the host itself might have made trust assumptions or may not be aware of the network topology changes that resulted from IPsec SAs from unauthenticated IKE peers.
Audit trail and peer identification
With NULL Authentication an established IKE session is no longer guaranteed to provide a verifiable (authenticated) entity known to the system or network. Implementers that implement NULL Authentication should ensure their implementation does not make any assumptions that depend on IKE peers being "friendly", "trusted" or "identifiable". 
IKE configuration selection
Combining authenticated and unauthenticated IKE peers on a single host can be dangerous, assuming the authenticated IKE peer gains more or different access from non-authenticated peers (otherwise, why not only allow unauthenticated peers). An unauthenticated IKE peer MUST NOT be able to reach resources only meant for authenticated IKE peers and MUST NOT be able to replace the Child SAs of an authenticated IKE peer.
Networking topology changes
When a host relies on packet filters or firewall software to protect itself, establishing an IKE SA and installing an IPsec SA might accidentally circumvent these packet filters and firewall restrictions, as the encrypted ESP (protocol 50) or ESPinUDP (UDP port 4500) packets do not match the packet filters defined. IKE peers supporting unauthenticated IKE MUST pass all decrypted traffic through the same packet filters and security mechanisms as incoming plaintext traffic.
